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This paper analyses how the factors breadth of con-
tent offerings, boundary resources, and exclusive con-
tent explain complementor participation in platform-
based ecosystems, in the context of video game consoles. 
Fixed effects regressions on a panel comprising two 
generations of consoles across six platforms show that 
the breadth of content offerings positively affects com-
plementor participation. We find that breadth of content 
offerings, but not boundary resources and exclusive 
content, are positively related to complementor partici-
pation. When studied in one model, breadth of content 
offerings dominates the relationship. Our results show 
how complementor ecosystems can be orchestrated to 
proliferate a variety of complementary product offer-
ings. 
1. Introduction 
Platform-based ecosystems have received increas-
ing attention in recent years to describe competitive en-
vironments [1]. Here, we define platforms as meta-or-
ganizations that federate and coordinate innovating and 
competing actors, facilitate economies of scale and 
scope, and entail a modular architecture [2]. Ecosystem 
refers to the platform leader and the providers of com-
plementary goods that increase the value of the platform 
to its users [3, 4]. For example, video game consoles 
such as Microsoft Xbox and Sony PlayStation are plat-
forms for which third-party game developers produce 
games consumed by end users. When users decide 
whether to buy into either of the two, they often consider 
the number and quality of the available complements 
next to the characteristics of the platform itself. This ef-
fect is known as indirect network effects [5] and high-
lights the importance of the developers of complemen-
tary products, called complementors, for the platform’s 
overall success.  
The participation of complementors on platforms, 
and the availability of complementary products, though, 
cannot be taken for granted [6]. Previous research has 
singled out factors that are expected to influence com-
plementor participation and lie within the platform’s 
sphere of influence. Such factors include the breadth of 
content offerings [7], the availability of boundary re-
sources, which are the tools and regulations that serve 
as an interface between platform owners and comple-
mentors [8, 9, 10], and exclusive content, content that is 
only published on the focal platform [11, 12, 13]. Alt-
hough availability of boundary resources is known to 
positively relate to complementor participation, it is not 
yet clear how it relates to complementor participation 
when studied in concert with the other two factors. This 
paper addresses the following question: How do these 
three factors together affect complementor participa-
tion? This matters as our understanding of coexisting 
complementor strategies and their influence on ecosys-
tem outcomes are still limited [14].  
These three factors capture different aspects of plat-
form competition. Breadth of content offerings and ex-
clusive content relate to indirect network effects. 
Boundary resources relates to modularity and expanda-
bility of the platform. All three factors also relate to 
technology strategy. Breadth of content offerings re-
flects choices regarding technological performance, 
such as Wii’s move towards simple and intuitive gaming 
instead of high-end performance [15]. Boundary re-
sources relates to the sharing to technological capabili-
ties, and exclusive content relates to technological com-
patibility across platforms, 
We empirically study boundary resources jointly 
with breadth of content offerings, and exclusive content 
and examine how they affect complementor participa-
tion. The use of longitudinal data highlights the process 
aspect in our research. We study these issues in the con-
text of the 7th and 8th generation of video game consoles 
in the video game industry. This ecosystem consists of 
the game console (e.g., Sony PlayStation) with its plat-
form leader (Sony in this example), video games (com-
plements) that are compatible with this specific game 
console, and the users of video game consoles. We show 
how three factors that are inherent and unique to plat-






form-based ecosystems affect the participation of com-
plementors, which is essential for the ecosystem inno-
vation process. Our results show that breadth of content 
offerings, but not boundary resources and exclusive 
content, are positively related to complementor partici-
pation. When studied in one model, breadth of content 
offerings dominates the relationship. This study sheds 
light on the dynamics of platform management by put-
ting federation [2] central, which in this case is the at-
traction of complementors. This is relevant as “…nei-
ther the existence nor the process of federation of com-
plementors into a collective can be taken for granted …” 
[2:1245]. This study contributes to the literature on or-
chestrating an ecosystem of complementors [2, 16], 
platform openness in general [7], and boundary re-
sources in particular [8, 9] by studying three factors that 
affect complementors’ intention to stay with a platform 
and by suggesting measures to address these.  
2. Theoretical background: complementor 
participation in platforms 
In many industries, platform-based business models 
are a way to reduce complexity by sharing modules, 
components, and other assets [17, 18] and by co-creat-
ing value outside the firm’s boundaries [19]. In some 
cases, the existence of a platform leads to the emergence 
of a platform ecosystem. By joining the platform eco-
system, complementors can access the platform’s end 
users [1]. Complementary goods and services are pri-
marily developed for the platform and increase the core 
platform's value [6]. In the literature, platforms have 
been approached from an economic and an engineering 
perspective [2]. The economic perspective sees plat-
forms as two (or multi-sided) markets and has a strong 
interest in the dynamics and mechanisms related to plat-
form competition [20, 21]. The growth of the installed 
base and the availability of complements are seen as the 
main mechanisms behind a platform’s value and market 
share [22, 23]. The value of a platform to its users is 
dependent on indirect network effects, which refer to the 
incremental increase in value to users that originates 
from the number and quality of products and services on 
another side of the market. Theoretically, three different 
patterns are possible: A monotonic pattern would imply 
that each additional complement increases the plat-
form’s value to uses. More likely, though, are decreas-
ing returns where the additional value stemming from 
addition complements decreases. Lastly, a critical value 
of complements may exist above which users experi-
ence no additional benefits [24]. 
Both direct and indirect network effects lead to 
some sort of ‘chicken and egg’ problem as users would 
hesitate to join the platform without the presence of ac-
tors on each of the sides [6, 25]. In this view, the rela-
tionship between both sides of the market is seen as a 
buyer-seller relationship, irrespective of whether it re-
fers to end users or innovating complementors [2]  
In contexts where the platform is not just a market 
place, its objective is different [26]. If a platform offers 
the technological infrastructure for the development of 
complementary innovations, it is important to align 
complementor incentives with the platform ecosystem’s 
objective [1, 27, 28]. This perspective on platforms, 
called engineering perspective, focuses on how to drive 
innovation across industries [2]. Central to this perspec-
tive is that platforms contribute to achieving economies 
of scope, defined as reducing costs by developing two 
products jointly instead of separately [2], which can be 
achieved by following a modular approach to platform 
design [29]. The architecture of a platform includes 
more stable components at its core and more variable 
components in its periphery [30]. In the case of video 
games, for example, the game console is at the plat-
form’s core while the complements (video games) are 
the periphery. For the most part, this stream views plat-
forms as stable components at the core upon which in-
novation occurs on modules by using stable interfaces 
[2] – an assumption that is questioned by digitalism 
which has made interfaces more fluid [8, 31]. 
This modular architecture makes platforms suitable 
for facilitating innovation [2], which is in line with mod-
ularity theory [32, 33]. Modularity reduces complexity 
by splitting systems into components arranged accord-
ing to a standardized architecture and connected via 
standardized interfaces. In this respect, modularity also 
facilitates innovation by reducing the scope of infor-
mation designers have to work with, enabling more spe-
cialization and the division of innovative tasks [34]. In-
terfaces are crucial for modularity and innovation as 
they divide innovative activities and connect them sim-
ultaneously [32].  
To draw on the knowledge and capabilities of ex-
ternal innovations and to enable independent experi-
mentation, platforms can publish boundary resources, 
which are the tools and regulations that mediate access 
to the platform's core [9]. Platform providers influence 
the degree of openness through boundary resources. In 
other words, boundary resources enable platform own-
ers to shift design capabilities to complementors [35]. 
This makes it easier to develop diverse complements for 
end users, thus combining economies of scale with prod-
uct differentiation and creating incentives for comple-
mentors [9]. Boundary resources are hence a facet of 
platform openness [36]. Openness covers both the tech-
nological dimension (e.g., accessibility of interfaces) 
and the organizational dimension (e.g., conditions to use 
the interfaces) [37]. Open standards are one of the 
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means to achieve technical openness [38, 39]. Organi-
zational openness can be controlled via rules and con-
tracts that determine whether, and to what extent, com-
plementors can participate in the platform [37]. In the 
context of video games, exclusive content is a facet of 
organizational openness. It refers to releasing a comple-
mentary product only on one platform, based on a con-
tractual agreement between the platform owner and the 
complementor [12]. At its core, exclusive content re-
stricts multihoming.  
An open strategy can help platform firms to de-
crease the cost of developing future products while also 
increasing development by reducing the amount of re-
design necessary for future product generations [40]. 
Giving complementors access to the platform increases 
their adoption rates and leads to more diverse and inno-
vative complementary product offerings [41]. However, 
these benefits are dependent on the right open platform 
strategy. To shed light on potential complementor strat-
egies, we first discuss three factors for complementor 
participation. 
2.1. Breadth of content offerings  
When deliberating whether to develop a comple-
ment for a specific platform, a complementor may con-
sider the value users derive from the marginal comple-
ment [24], together with the number of available com-
plements. The complementor may be less willing to de-
velop for a platform in the cases of decreasing returns to 
scale or a critical value of complements, especially if 
current complement supply is high, or current comple-
ment supply is close or above the critical value.  
Consumer demands are often heterogeneous, and 
platforms can address these demands by expanding to 
different markets. It is likely that the above-mentioned 
patterns of return for additional complements are at 
work in parallel across various markets. For example, 
early smartphone apps were mostly productivity-related 
tools such as calculators, address books, and note pads. 
Today, smartphone apps cover all conceivable areas, in-
cluding health (e.g., nutrition trackers), automotive 
(e.g., CarPlay), and many more. Hence, expanding the 
opportunities for complementors to reach into different 
markets allows the platform to increase the strength of 
indirect network effects as individual users may rely on 
particular likes and dislikes, resulting in a unique com-
bination of frequented game title markets. Variety-seek-
ing teenagers, for instance, often use specific video 
games very extensively for several weeks to then trade 
them for a new game without ever returning to it [42]. 
Giving complementors horizontal access to different 
markets allows them to differentiate their products and 
specialize, thereby decreasing competition compared to 
a platform focused on a narrower set of markets and 
avoiding situations of crowding. We define breadth of 
content offerings as the variety of markets that a plat-
form is represented in via complementary products. 
Breadth, here, refers to the number of categories (as op-
posed to depth, which is the number of items per cate-
gory) [7].  
Similarly, if a console is already represented in a 
specific game title market, complementors who intend 
to enter that market might be more inclined to do so on 
this console, as the platform will already be known for 
serving this market. That might give the focal console 
an advantage over competing consoles that are not pre-
sent in that market. Boudreau [43] supports this argu-
ment with evidence from the context of mobile handheld 
devices. He found an increase in hardware complements 
when many complementors from heterogeneous indus-
tries were given access to the platform. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis (H1). Breadth of content offerings has 
a positive effect on complementor participation in a 
platform. 
2.2. Boundary resources 
Relying on complementors poses the challenge of 
designing the technology so that complementors have 
access to the core technology but without exposing too 
much of it. In the case of video games, the right tools 
and resources allow game developers to develop high-
quality games that take advantage of the console’s 
unique architecture, enabling a rich experience for end 
users. Developing a game involves large investments of 
effort and time – here is where game engines come to 
the rescue for game developers. 
The literature on boundary resources focuses on the 
perspective of platform owners [8, 9, 44]. Boundary re-
sources have mostly been studied in terms of APIs and 
Software Development Kits as a means to involve com-
plementors [8, 9, 45]. They are an important tool for 
managing the tension between securing control of the 
platform infrastructure and maintaining its generativity 
[8, 46]. Platform owners can exert control via boundary 
resources by introducing new ones or modifying exist-
ing ones [47]. Ghazawneh and Henfridsson [9] intro-
duced the concept of self-resourcing, referring to the de-
velopment of additional boundary resources by comple-
mentors themselves in response to perceived limitations 
of existing boundary resources. In this respect, bound-
ary resources feature “feedback mechanisms and mutual 
shaping” [9:178]. New boundary resources can be initi-
ated by both the platform owner and complementors so 
that the platform owner's role could be both reactive and 
proactive. The use of some boundary resources may also 
be mandatory. Still, most boundary resources are op-
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tional, and their use depends on the preference and de-
sign choices of complementors in their pursuit to serve 
their clients [9]. A better assortment of boundary re-
sources may allow complementors to focus more on 
game design and creative tasks instead of developing 
core technologies and making a platform more interest-
ing for complementors. Boundary resources can also be 
seen as modules that facilitate economies of scope. In 
the case of third-party applications for Apple’s iOS plat-
form, Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013) found that 
the number of applications on the platform increased 
with every new boundary resource introduced. This sug-
gests that boundary resources may be important to at-
tract complementors to the platform, as captured in our 
second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis (H2). The availability of boundary re-
sources has a positive effect on complementor partici-
pation in a platform. 
2.3. Exclusive content 
Platform owners have used exclusive contracts with 
complementors to differentiate their product offerings 
from rivals through the exclusive offering of high-qual-
ity or premium content [48, 49]. Exclusive content re-
fers to content that is only available on the focal plat-
form [12] so that a specific game title would only be 
available on one platform. Whether to pursue exclusive 
contracts with complementors is a strategic trade-off for 
both platform and complementors.  
From the perspective of platform owners, exclusive 
contracts with complementors are a way to secure 
unique content for end users and to enjoy the benefits of 
indirect network effects. As exclusivity usually comes 
in exchange for a lump-sum payment or an attractive li-
censing fee, the platform owner must compare the pos-
sible benefits gained from exclusive content against the 
cost of reducing licensing fees or lump-sum payments 
[12]. From the perspective of complementors, whether 
to join a platform depends on both the installed base of 
the focal platform and the installed base of competing 
platforms. The complementors’ incentive to license 
their product to a platform is dependent on the market's 
potential that they can reach through the platform’s in-
stalled base [50]. In markets with several incompatible 
platforms, complements developed for one platform do 
not function with other platforms. In this situation, with 
similar market shares, complementors tend to multi-
home to spread the fixed costs of development over sev-
eral platforms [12]. However, multi-homing is not for 
free as variable costs (called porting costs) are necessary 
to make a complement compatible with another plat-
form. Additionally, the availability of a complement on 
other platforms may reduce the indirect network effects 
stemming from this complement and possibly lead to 
higher royalty payments to other platform owners [51].  
Some scholars have studied exclusivity empirically. 
Lee [52] finds that the absence of exclusive contracts 
may actually reinforce an incumbent’s leading position 
as high quality software would primarily be released on 
the incumbent platform based on its higher installed 
base. In this respect, exclusive contracts might help 
complementors release high-quality content at very fa-
vourable conditions on the smaller platform. We argue 
that exclusivity might signal the platform’s aspiration to 
potential future complementors and attract new comple-
mentors. Furthermore, complementors compete 
strongly on the quality of content. Cennamo, Ozalp, and 
Kretschmer [53] show that the quality of complements 
drops if complementors decide to produce simultane-
ously for different platforms, which could be a quality 
signal for future complementors. A higher share of ex-
clusive content on a platform may hence signal superior 
quality to aspiring complementors. Hence:  
Hypothesis (H3). Exclusive content has a positive 
influence on complementor participation in a platform. 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data and sample 
The video game industry is an ideal setting to un-
derstand complementor-platform dynamics. Several 
studies [e.g., 28, 50] have used this setting to show the 
typical characteristics of platform ecosystems. The in-
dustry is characterized by technological changes that 
have led to the emergence of eight generations of incom-
patible video game consoles to date, with new genera-
tions being introduced roughly every five years [13]. 
Although competition has been fierce in each genera-
tion, this has not led to one dominant console. Conse-
quently, consumers carefully consider each console in 
their purchasing decision for game quality and diversity. 
Moreover, the success of a platform in this industry 
heavily depends on the platform owner’s ability to at-
tract complementors (video game developers) who pro-
duce high-quality content (video games) for the respec-
tive platform (game console). 
We created a panel from multiple sources. We ob-
tained quarterly global sales data from VGChartz. This 
industry research firm compiled a game database cover-
ing over 40,000 titles and 1.5 million data points, span-
ning two generations of consoles and game titles (sev-
enth and eighth generation, 2005-2015). It also docu-
ments every game title’s release year, publisher, devel-
oper, genre, and the platform on which it was released. 
We validated the data by cross-checking with Mobig-
ames.com, which has been consulted for information on 
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game titles by other studies [12]. The Internet Game Da-
tabase (IGDB) provides information on game engines 
available for each console (including release dates), val-
idated by cross-checking with online news and press re-
leases. In summary, our dataset comprises six game 
platforms and two generations, during which 2199 game 
titles were released.  
3.2. Measures 
Regarding the dependent variable, we conceptualize in-
direct network effects as complementor participation, 
which we define as the count of unique game developers 
on platform 𝑖𝑖 in quarter 𝑡𝑡. Boudreau [43] found a causal 
effect of the number of complementors on the number 
of complements. From this follows that a platform 
owner would be concerned to increase the participation 
of complementors relative to the competing platforms. 
We refer to unique game developers to imply that a 
game developer with more than one game for a platform 
is counted only once, irrespective of the number of 
games by that game developer on the specific platform.  
Regarding independent variables, we measure 
breadth of content offerings as the proportion of game 
genres produced for platform 𝑖𝑖 over the total existing 
game genres in quarter 𝑡𝑡. A specific genre represents a 
user group that is characterized by distinct demands. 
Here, genres serve as a proxy for markets, and the avail-
ability of a game title by platform 𝑖𝑖 in a specific genre is 
seen as catering to this market. The more genres a plat-
form covers, the more accessible it is to different mar-
kets from the complementor perspective. We operation-
alize availability of boundary resources as a count of 
game engines available for platform 𝑖𝑖 in quarter 𝑡𝑡. Game 
engines are software tools to equip game developers 
with a set of features to support core game development 
areas such as audio, video, physics, or animation.  We 
measure exclusive content as the proportion of exclusive 
game titles produced on platform 𝑖𝑖 in quarter 𝑡𝑡 to total 
exclusive game titles for all platforms in quarter 𝑡𝑡. A 
game title is exclusive if it is available only for the focal 
platform and never on the rival platforms during the pe-
riod of observation. Hence, exclusive content is the plat-
form’s ability to negotiate exclusive contracts with 
game developers, as also used by others [50] to study 
the effect of exclusivity on hardware demand. 
Exclusive content and breadth of content offerings 
are defined as proportions as we expect complementors 
to weigh exclusive content on a particular platform in 
comparison to other platforms. Similarly, we expect 
them to compare portfolios of served game genres 
across platforms, rather than the absolute number. With 
boundary resources, we deem it more likely that com-
plementors are on the look for specific game engines ra-
ther than taking a portfolio-perspective. 
We control for installed base as the cumulative unit 
sales of console 𝑖𝑖 in quarter 𝑡𝑡 − 1, as it has an influence 
on indirect network effects and the intention of comple-
mentors to develop games for a platform. We use the 
natural logarithm of installed base. The video game in-
dustry shows a strong seasonal pattern as many new 
games and consoles are released in the last quarter of the 
year. We, therefore, use a seasonality dummy (season-
ality) to control for the last quarter of the year.  
Whenever a new generation of a platform is re-
leased, consumers are drawn to the new and technolog-
ically superior platform. This decreases complementors’ 
support for the older version of that platform as the di-
rect network effects tend to decrease with the introduc-
tion of newer generations. As in Srinivasan and Venka-
traman [13], we use a dummy variable (generation 
dummy) for the period in which both a newer and an 
older generation of a platform coexist. 
3.3. Estimation method 
As discussed above, we seek to estimate whether, 
and to what extent, breadth of content offerings, bound-
ary resources, and exclusive content are related to the 
number of complementors that offer complements for a 
specific platform. To study this, we estimate conditional 
fixed-effects Poisson panel data models of how the 
count of complementors depends on each of these di-
mensions, and on all of them simultaneously.  
The Poisson distribution requires that variance and 
mean be equal [54], which does not hold based on our 
dependent variable complementor participation (the 
variance is more than 10 times the mean). In this case, a 
negative binomial distribution may be a better fit. How-
ever, Allison and Waterman [55] show that the condi-
tional negative binomial model for panel data is not a 
true fixed-effects method as it allows for the introduc-
tion of individual specific regressors. It does not neces-
sarily remove the individual fixed effect, it only does so 
if the individual overdispersion parameter is related to 
the individual fixed effects in a very specific way [56]. 
Based on these properties, Wooldridge advises against 
the use of the negative binomial distribution in combi-
nation with fixed effects (See post #4: https://www.sta-
talist.org/forums/forum/general-stata-discussion/gen-
eral/1580248-issue-about-xtpoisson-xtnbreg-panel-
data-regression-with-not-concave-iteration). As the 
Poisson distribution is more suitable for mean estima-
tions, we rely on this distribution for the estimations in 
this paper.  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  f(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,
𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,
𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
Page 6693
6 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , complementor participation, is our dependent 
variable. Installed base was scaled by dividing by 100. 
We chose the fixed effects estimator as the preferred 
method for several reasons. It is suitable for analysing 
variables that vary over time [57]. It removes all time-
invariant characteristics of the platform, mitigating 
omitted-variable bias due to time-invariant characteris-
tics. Testing for fixed effects versus random effects with 
the Hausman test also recommends the fixed-effects es-
timator over random-effects.  
We calculated McFadden’s [58] pseudo r-squared 
based on the log-likelihood for the full model and the 
model with only the intercept. As Stata’s xtpoisson, fe 
does not work without independent variables, we used 
the command poisson with dummies for the individual 
platforms to compute the model with intercept only.  
Theoretically, the causation could also be opposite 
to what we hypothesize (from boundary resources to 
complementors) as game engines (these underlie the 
variable boundary resources) could belong to the very 
game developers who are the complementors. This 
would mean that boundary resources are driven by the 
number of complementors. The other independent vari-
ables (breadth of content offerings and exclusive con-
tent) could also be driven by the dependent variable. If 
we were studying a situation with only two platforms, 
all the variation would be explained by exclusive games, 
since non-exclusive games are available on both plat-
forms. This is less the case in a three-way competition, 
but an exclusive game as we define it increases comple-
mentor participation if this is the only game offered by 
this complementor. Similar concerns may apply to 
breadth of content offerings. The serving of a genre 
manifests as the platform having a game on offer in that 
genre. In the case of high breadth (many categories) and 
low depth (few games per category), our dependent var-
iable could also affect the breadth of content offerings. 
We use a lag of each of the independent variables as we 
are interested in their effect on future complementors 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
The panel contains 139 observations across six plat-
forms (PS3, Xbox 360, Wii, Wii U, PS4, and Xbox One) 
with an average of 23.2 time periods per platform (the 
data is recorded quarterly). We computed pairwise cor-
relations for all variables in the model. At first, we also 
included platform age in the model but dropped based 
on very high correlations with installed base (0.941). All 
correlations are below 0.5 (magnitudes), with the high-
est correlations between breadth of content offerings 
and complementor participation (0.570), and exclusive 
content and breadth of content offerings (0.529), and the 
generation dummy and installed base (0.531). Table 1 
contains summary statistics. 
4. Results 
4.1. Main Results 
We present the results in Table 2. We rely on con-
ditional fixed-effects Poisson panel data models. In all 
models, complementor participation is the dependent 
variable. Model 1 contains the control variables only, 
explaining 42% of the variance in the sample. We hy-
pothesized that the presence of a platform in various 
markets makes it easier to attract complementors, as 
captured in the variable breadth of content offerings, and 
we found evidence for this hypothesis in model 2. 
Breadth of content offerings positively influences com-
plementor participation, as indicated by the coefficient 
of 1.655 (p<0.001). In model 3, boundary resources, to-
gether with the controls, are regressed on complementor 
participation. The coefficient of 0.047 (p=0.028) sup-
ports the hypothesis that the availability of boundary re-
sources is positively related to complementor participa-
tion. However, the coefficient’s magnitude is rather 
small, and additional regressions (not reported) show 
that boundary resources alone is not a strong predictor 
of complementor participation (in a model with inde-
pendent variables only, without controls). Taken to-
gether, we do not consider this evidence robust and are 
careful to draw conclusions with respect to boundary re-
sources. In model 4, exclusive content is regressed on 
the dependent variable together with the controls. Ex-
clusive content has a positive and insignificant coeffi-
cient of 0.742 (p=0.255), refuting the hypothesis. 
In model 5, we combine all variables into one 
model. Comparing r-squared across all models suggests 
that most of the explanatory power lies with breadth of 
content offerings, with a coefficient of 1,564 (p=0.000). 
In terms of r-squared, model 5 offers no substantive ad-
vantage over model 3, where only breadth of content of-
ferings and the controls are regressed on complementor 
participation. Although distinctly positive together with 
the controls, the coefficient of boundary resources is 
now small and insignificant, with a coefficient of 0.026 
(p=0.149), as it seems that this information is conveyed 
by breadth of content offerings. 
Taken together, we can accept H1 (related to 
breadth of content offerings) but cannot confirm H2 (re-
lated to boundary resources) and H3 (related to exclu-
sive content). Conceivably, boundary resources are 
more important in the nascent stages than in mature 
stages. After introducing a new platform, developers 
have not yet had the time to accumulate experience with 
the platform, so that better support might make the dif-
ference in opting for or against a specific platform. 
However, during later stages, developers may already 
have gained experience, and developer knowledge re-
garding a particular platform might already have spread 
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and led to commodification, reducing the importance of 
boundary resources.  
4.2. Robustness and comparison with other 
studies 
To address multicollinearity concerns, we compute 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs). The highest VIF 
(2.80) regards breadth of content offerings in model 5. 
All other VIFs are below 2.1, concluding that multicol-
linearity is not a problem.  
As Ghazawneh and Henfridsson [9] attribute a 
prominent role to boundary resources, one would expect 
a more pronounced result. In the 7th generation of video 
game consoles, Wii is an outlier as it targets more casual 
gamers with a larger variety of less high-end games. 
With this strategy, Wii is distinguished from the other 
platforms as its strategy requires less sophisticated game 
engines – yet it manages to attract complementors. Ad-
ditional data analysis supports this point. We created an 
additional dataset with game engines, release dates, and 
the platforms the game engines were available for. Cor-
relating the availability of game engines per platform 
shows very high correlations for PS3, PS4, XOne, and 
X360, and low to low negative correlations between the 
former platforms and Wii / WiiU The effect of boundary 
resources seems contingent on the whether the platform 
pursues a high-end or variety strategy (calculations not 
shown).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Complementor participation 21.683 17.476 0.000 107 
Breadth of content offerings 0.646 0.250 0.000 1.000 
Boundary resources 19.050 7.901 7.000 30.000 
Exclusive content 0.281 0.237 0.000 1.000 
Installed base 17.162 1.161 14.040 18.430 
Generation dummy 0.223 0.418 0.000 1.000 
Seasonality 0.252 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Table 2. Regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Dependent variable: complementors 
Installed base 0.142*** 0.158*** -0.00397 0.174*** 0.0793*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0450) (0.0477) (0.0456) (0.0146) 
Generation dummy -1.394*** -0.860*** -1.411*** -1.275*** -0.902*** 
 (0.483) (0.184) (0.468) (0.292) (0.259) 
Seasonality 0.744*** 0.675*** 0.746*** 0.725*** 0.681*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.121) (0.0923) (0.126) 
Breadth of content offerings   1.655***   1.564*** 
 (0.452)   (0.217) 
Boundary resources   0.0474**  0.0259 
   (0.0216)  (0.0180) 
Exclusive content    0.742 0.0689 
    (0.651) (0.517) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -639.240 -529.78595 -626.22564 -604.33453 -526.27842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.421 0.520 0.432 0.452 0.523 
Observations / platforms 139 / 6 139 / 6 139 / 6 139 / 6 139 / 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data covering six platforms in the 7th and 8th generation of video 
game consoles. Conditional fixed-effects Poisson regression.  
 
This difference with respect to other studies might 
occur because the effect of boundary resources is driven 
by specific, high-quality boundary resources rather than 
their count. While we do not see a clear association with 
respect to complementor participation, it is imaginable 
that boundary resources help attract the right comple-
mentors, i.e., those producing high quality and novel 
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complements. It may, however, be difficult to consider 
boundary resource quality at scale.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We examined how breadth of content offerings, 
boundary resources, and exclusive content affect com-
plementor participation. We hypothesized that each 
would have a positive influence on complementor par-
ticipation and tested this in the context of the 7th and 8th 
generation of video game consoles. The results show 
that breadth of content offerings, but not exclusive con-
tent and boundary resources, are positively related to 
complementor participation. When studied in one 
model, breadth of content offerings dominates the rela-
tionship. This highlights the importance of studying fac-
ets simultaneously instead of focusing on single aspects.  
The three factors for complementor participation 
are related to several streams in platform literature. 
Boundary resources, as tools and regulations that serve 
as an interface between platform owners and comple-
mentors [8, 9, 10], relate to the literature on access open-
ness, i.e., decreasing the cost of complementary product 
development [59]. We contribute to the measurement 
and dimensionality of platform openness by suggesting 
measures for the breadth of content offerings and for 
boundary resources, something scholars have not yet 
agreed on [7]. Previous approaches to studying bound-
ary resources were mostly qualitative [9, 47]. Exclusive 
content, content that is only published on the focal plat-
form [11, 12, 13], relates to platform openness in the 
classical sense, as a restriction to multihome [60]. But it 
also relates to platform differentiation as a form of con-
tent curation. Breadth of content offerings and exclusive 
content relate to different kinds of network effects. Our 
study contributes by testing these factors’ effect on com-
plementor participation, which has rarely been studied 
to date [7]. All three factors also relate to technology 
strategy. Breadth of content offerings reflects choices 
regarding technological performance.  
This study also contributes to the growing literature 
on how the hub of a platform federates and orchestrates 
an ecosystem of complementors [16]. Gawer [2] calls 
for research on the drivers and consequences of changes 
in platform openness. Further, several studies propose 
relationships between platform openness and various or-
ganizational outcomes, such as market growth [61], co-
ordination [62], or value capture and value creation [19, 
38]. The choice of our dependent variable adds to the 
literature by focusing on what Gawer [2] describes as a 
federation, which may be loosely defined as the gather-
ing or joining together of actors into a larger organiza-
tion. In the absence of managerial hierarchy or author-
ity, as it is the case in platform-based ecosystems, a fed-
eration of innovative agents is one of the initial steps in 
nurturing an ecosystem. In other words, complements 
can only become available once complementors have 
decided to commit to the platform.  
From a practical perspective, the results can guide 
managers on how to increase complementor participa-
tion in their platform. By studying how to influence the 
number of complementors instead of the number of 
complements, our study helps practitioners create and 
maintain a diverse ecosystem of complementors. Our re-
sults suggest that breadth of content offerings is most 
relevant in attracting future complementors. When ne-
gotiating exclusive content agreements, platform lead-
ers should consider the differentiation and positioning 
of the platform towards customers and its attractiveness 
to future complementors. Our results do not show that 
the number of boundary resources is strongly associated 
with complementor participation. However, this does 
not preclude that qualitative attributes of boundary re-
sources are relevant.  
Our findings are subjected to several limitations. 
The factors for complementor participation we have 
studied are not exhaustive. While focusing on comple-
mentor dynamics, our data reflect video gaming plat-
forms and interconnected ecosystems. We study 
whether different factors for complementor participa-
tion are related to new complementors (game develop-
ers) joining the platform. From our model's perspective, 
a complementor can join one or several of the covered 
platforms or none of these. But the model does not re-
flect the multitude of other options beyond video gam-
ing that complementors face in practice, which poses 
limitations to our findings. Future research could incor-
porate these aspects by covering several types of plat-
forms (consoles, handheld devices, PCs). Further, the 
results may benefit from the inclusion of more control 
variables. It would be desirable to improve the identifi-
cation of causal effects, for example using an instrumen-
tal variable approach [11].  
We see promising research directions in studying 
the attraction of especially productive, successful, or in-
novative complementors in addition to our measure of 
general complementor participation. It seems that the 
literature on complements evolves in two camps, one 
studying complementors [e.g., 63, 64], the other study-
ing complements [e.g., 8, 14]. Future research could ex-
plore the relation between the two measures of ecosys-
tem activity. Future studies could consider differences 
in quality, affordance, or usefulness of boundary re-
sources. For example, Petrik and Herzwurm [10] study 
boundary resource quality with respect to complementor 
satisfaction which might help in considering quality dif-
ferences. Ghazawneh and Henfridsson [9] conceptualize 
boundary resources as serving two distinct purposes. It 
may be worthwhile to differentiate between boundary 
resources for sourcing (control-related) and resourcing 
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(scope, diversity) [9]. Similarly, our measure of bound-
ary resources counts all published boundary resources 
but remains inconclusive about their actual use by com-
plementors. Due to the industry's nature, it is difficult to 
obtain information about game engines that were used 
by complementors to develop game titles.  
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